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What is a musical sign?: 
A guess at the riddle
Who’ll tell me my secret, 
The ages have kept?— 
I  aw aited  the seer 
While they slumbered and slept. 
—Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Sphinx (Emerson 1904, 20)
A sign is something by knowing which 
w e know something more. 
—Charles Sanders Peirce (PW  31-32)
ABSTRACT: Issues surrounding the nature of the musical sign loom large in the development of a vi­
able musical semeiotic that goes beyond ad hoc or impressionistic appropriations of terminology. This 
article articulates an understanding of the sign with specific relevance to the analysis of musical topics 
by rigorously applying Peirce’s semeiotic theory to illuminate the nature of sign functioning in music.
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Around 1890, the American philosopher and polymath Charles Sand­
ers Peirce (1839-1914) sketched an outline for a book to be titled, “A Guess at the 
Riddle,” with a Vignette of the Sphynx [sic] below the Title”.1 This never-completed
1 Charles S. Peirce, The Collected Papers o f Charles Sanders Peirce, Vols. 1-6 ed. C. Hart- 
shorne and P. Weiss, vols. 7-8 ed. A. W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1931-35; 1958), 
1:354-416 (hereafter abbreviated CP followed by volume and paragraph numbers). This selection 
can also be found in Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, 
Vols. 1-2, various editors at the Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992 
and 1998), 1:245-79 (hereafter abbreviated EP followed by volume and page numbers); Charles 
S. Peirce, Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, 6 vols. to date (Bloomington: 
Indiana Univ. Press, 1982-), 6:166-210 (hereafter abbreviated W followed by volume and page 
numbers); and Charles S. Peirce, Peirce on signs: Writings on semiotic, ed. James Hoopes 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 186-202. Peirce’s writings are available 
in several collections. To facilitate further investigation, I cross-reference as many of the citations 
as possible to these other sources. In addition those cited above, see Charles S. Peirce, Philosophi­
book was envisioned by Peirce as the definitive account of his triad of metaphysi­
cal categories in terms of its relevance to fundamental issues in logic, metaphys­
ics (with an eye toward a theory of cognition), psychology, physiology, biology 
(in specific, by way of explaining the true nature of the Darwinian hypothesis), 
physics, sociology, and theology, and he predicted (with characteristic immod­
esty) that, should the treatise ever be written, it would be ‘“one of the births of 
time.” That this birth never occurred is lamentable, especially since it would have 
accelerated an informed appreciation of Peirce’s comprehensive enterprise. For­
tunately, Peirce’s prolific pen provided us with an almost overwhelming body of 
other material. (It is estimated that a complete compilation of his writings would 
take over one hundred volumes.) In these writings, Peirce detailed the systematic 
consequences of his categorical theory, and nowhere is this more pervasive or 
more persuasive than in his conception of the doctrine of signs or semeiotic.2 In 
view of a somewhat standard trend in the writings on the subject, I will distinguish 
among terms as follows: (1) “semiology” designates Saussurean-based approaches 
that take a dyadic model of the sign as their starting point; (2) “semeiotic” refers 
to an explicitly Peircean understanding of the doctrine of signs; and (3) the more 
familiar semiotics (noun) or “semiotic” (adjective) is used when the distinction is 
not critical. Note, however, that while semiotics generally subsumes semiology, 
it is not necessarily coextensive with semeiotic. It should become clear that this 
article strives to craft a musical semeiotic as opposed to either a musical semiology 
or a musical semiotics.
cal writings o f Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955) and Charles S. 
Peirce and Victoria A. M. L. S.-W. L. Welby-Gregory, Semiotic and signifies: The correspondence 
between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, ed. Charles S. Hardwick and James Cook 
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1977) (hereafter abbreviated PW).
2 There are nettlesome complications surrounding how the doctrine of signs should best be 
designated that go beyond mere sectarian quibbles. The standard explanation is that, although 
the terms are essentially synonymous, continental European sign theorists prefer semiology while 
American theorists use semiotics. To name the science that he predicted, Ferdinand de Saussure 
chose semiologie: “A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would 
be a part of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology 
(from the Greek semeion ‘sign’). Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern 
them. Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right 
to existence, a place staked out in advance” (Ferdinand d. Saussure, Course in General Lingui­
stics, ed. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, and Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin [LaSalle, 
IL: Open Court, 1986,1983], 16). Peirce, following John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, 2 vols., ed. Alexander C. Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), 461-2, 
alternated between semeiotic and semiotic, usually opting for the former (for a discussion of the 
etymological rationale underlying Peirce’s choices, see Max H. Fisch, “Peirce’s General Theory 
of Signs,” in Sight, Sound, and Sense, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok, Advances in Semiotics (Bloomin­
gton: Indiana University Press, 1978), 31-70). To the best of my knowledge, Peirce never used 
the term “semiotics”, which is a more recent formation apparently modeled on optics, linguistics, 
physics, and so on (but compare logic and rhetoric).
Save for a few notable exceptions (e.g., the icon/index/symbol trichotomy), 
Peirce’s ideas have been avoided by a majority of musical semioticians, and they 
have yet to find a comfortable home in inquiries detailing how music might be prof­
itably analyzed as a system of signs.3 Indeed, from its inception musical semiotics 
has been largely dominated by the semiology cursorily sketched in the writings 
of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Although there are some points of 
tangency between Peirce’s semeiotic and Saussure’s semiology, the pivotal differ­
ences in scope, complexity, depth, and, most importantly, the ontology of the sign 
make syncretic amalgamations of the two traditions difficult to sustain convinc­
ingly. Whereas Saussure envisioned a semiology that takes what he perceived to 
be the structure of the linguistic sign as its starting point, arguing in one place that 
“linguistics can become the master-pattern for all branches of semiology”,4 Peirce’s 
general theory of signs was conceived and constructed to subsume everything capa­
ble of being a sign, in other words, everything that can be interpreted by a feeling, 
action, or thought.5 The broadness of his conception, the sweeping nature of which
3 An examination of applications of Peirce’s ideas to music lies beyond the purview of this 
study (but see Raymond Monelle, Linguistics and Semiotics In Music, Contemporary music 
studies 5 [Chur, Switzerland, Philadelphia: Harwood Academic, 1992] for an excellent survey). 
Consequently, I will simply list here a few authors (not otherwise mentioned in this study) who, 
to varying extents, have applied Peircean concepts to music: Wilson Coker, Music and Meaning: 
A Theoretical Introduction to Musical Aesthetics (New York: Free Press, 1972); David L. Mosley, 
Gesture, sign, and song: An interdisciplinary approach to Schumann’s Liederkreis opus 39, New 
connections 3 (New York: P. Lang, 1990); John Stopford, “Structuralism, Semiotics, and Musico­
logy,” The British Journal of Aesthetics 24, no. 2 (1984), doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/24.2.129.; Eero 
Tarasti, “Some Peircean and Greimasian Semiotic Concepts as Applied to Music,” in The Semiotic 
Web 1988, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok, Donna J. Umiker-Sebeok and Evan P. Young, Approaches to 
semiotics 85 (Berlin, New York, Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 1989), 445-59; Eero Tarasti, 
A Theory o f Musical Semiotics, Advances in semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994), especially 54-8; Arjan van Baest and Hans van Driel, The Semiotics ofC.S. Peirce Applied 
to Music: A M atter o f Belief (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1995) and Juha Ojala, Space in 
Musical Semiosis: An Abductive Theory o f the Musical Composition Process, Acta semiotica 
fennica 33 (Imatra: International Semiotics Institute at Imatra; Semiotic Society of Finland; 
Dept, of Musicology, University of Helsinki, 2009). I have examined the art song in terms of 
Peirce’s semeiotic in William P. Dougherty, “The Play of Interpretants: A Peircean Approach to 
Beethoven’s Lieder,” in The Peirce Seminar Papers: An Annual of Semiotic Analysis, ed. Michael 
Shapiro (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 67-95; William P. Dougherty, “Mixture, Song, Semeiotic,” in Music 
and Signs: Semiotic and Cognitive Studies in Music, ed. Ioannis Zannos (Bratislava: ASCO Art 
and Science, 1999), 368-78. For an application of most of Peirce’s sign typologies to music see 
Raymond Monelle, “Music and the Peircean Trichotomies,” International Review of the Aesthetics 
and Sociology o f Music 22, no. 1 (1991), 99-108.
4 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 68.
5 Peirce envisioned a semeiotic that was not limited to human responses, but that also in­
cluded animal responses (e.g., deer sniffing the air for danger). Although his emphasis on mental 
interpretants is paramount, Peirce occasionally spoke of the “habits” of plants (such as a flower 
turning to the sun) and nonliving objects (such as water in a riverbed) as examples of semeiosis 
(CP 5:492 and 5:538). The formidable expository obstacles that loomed before his over-arching
can be adduced from his claim that “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it 
is not composed exclusively of signs”,6 coupled with its painstaking philosophi­
cal grounding make Peirce’s semeiotic a treasure trove of valuable insights. Even 
though Peirce had little to say about music as a semeiotic phenomenon, this article 
will show how the theoretical acuity and explanatory power of his system can be 
fruitfully applied to the analysis of musical signification. In specific, it will ground 
the notion of the musical topic in an explicitly Peircean framework to illustrate 
how his general theory of signs clarifies the ways in which the expressive signifi­
cance of a musical sign is a vital component of music’s semeiotic structure. In the 
process, it will demonstrate that one of the rewards of embracing Peirce’s theories 
as axiomatic is the way in which they indicate the kinds of reorientation that are 
necessary in a theory of musical semiotics and in the goals of semiotic analysis. 
Finally, this essay, with its deliberate and direct focus on fundamental semeiotic 
concepts and terminology, will help clarify some of the basic issues and concerns of 
musical semioticians so that music theorists may better evaluate the terminology 
and methodologies that are increasingly becoming a part of their domain.
The starting point for any theory of musical semiotics has to be the ontology of 
the musical sign. Although the earliest musical semioticians (e.g., the taxonomic- 
empiricists such as Nicolas Ruwet and Jean-Jacques Nattiez) at first by-passed the 
problems posed by the musical sign, more recent studies have addressed these issues
view were reluctantly acknowledged by Peirce in one of his letters: “I define a Sign as anything 
which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon 
a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the 
former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own 
broader conception understood” (PW  80-81). Recommended examinations of Peirce’s semeiotic 
enterprise are Michael Shapiro, The Sense of Grammar: Language as Semeiotic (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1983)., David Savan, An Introduction to C.S. Peirce’s Full System of 
Semeiotic (Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle, 1988), James Jakob Liszka, A General Introduction 
to the Semeiotic o f Charles Sanders Peirce (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), Tho­
mas Short, “Semeiosis and Intentionality,” Transactions o f the Charles S. Peirce Society, no. 17 
(1981) and Thomas Short, Peirce’s Theory o f Sings (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).
6 CP 5:448n. Regarding the disciplinary thresholds of semeiotic, Umberto Eco contends 
that the study of signs is “co-extensive with the whole range of cultural phenomena, however 
pretentious that approach may at first seem” (Umberto Eco, A Theory o f Semiotics, 1st ed., 
Midland Book 217 [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976], 6). Deely summarizes this 
all-encompassing outlook as follows: “The semiotic point of view is the perspective that results 
from the sustained attempt to live reflectively with and follow out the consequences of one sim­
ple realization: the whole of our experience, from its most primitive origins in sensation to its 
most refined achievements of understanding, is a network or web of sign relations. This point of 
view cannot be reduced to an ideology without losing what is proper to it for the reason that its 
boundaries are those of the understanding itself in its activity of interpreting dependency upon 
the cognate interpretations of perception and sensation” (John N. Deely, Basics of Semiotics, 
Advances in Semiotics [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990], 13). On the other side of the 
disciplinary coin, if these panoramic programmatic claims for the breadth of semeiotic are to be 
taken seriously, then music obviously becomes an essential testing ground for semeiotic analysis.
more directly. Unfortunately, the development of a cogent conception of the musical 
sign has proved extremely difficult, and the result is that in most music-semiotic 
circles, the musical sign emerges as a rather free-floating and amorphous entity that 
is shaped to fit the specific analytic situation at hand.7 For instance, V. Kofi Agawu 
argues that “to insist on a single and stable definition of [the] musical sign is . . .  to 
falsify the semiotic enterprise even before it has begun”.8 An unfortunate outcome 
of Agawu’s reluctance to commit to a single definition of the musical sign is that 
his appeals to apparently stable sign categories become suspect: for instance, his 
identification of topical signs,9 structural signs,10 false signs,11 referential signs,12 
pure signs,13 middle or transitional signs,14 closural or ending signs,15 conventional 
and formal signs,16 compound signs,17 generic signs,18 surface signs,19 and ontologi­
cal signs20 as sign types. To be fair to his path-breaking work, Agawu’s informative 
analyses typically clarify the heuristic value of his classifications. In addition, Agawu 
is correct in asserting that any theory of musical semiotics must incorporate some 
degree of methodological flexibility to accommodate the fluid teleology of music as 
a semeiotic system, otherwise there is no means to account for growth and change 
in specific types of sign usages. Nevertheless, specific compositional cues have to 
be grounded in an appropriately ramified conception of semeiosis. For example, 
although Mahler’s use of the pastoral topic is different than Beethoven’s, whose 
use differs from Scarlatti’s, it is their commonality in sign structure that allows 
us to hear them as tokens of the same topical type. As such, an inventory of sign 
typologies that is not anchored in “a single and stable” definition of the sign, in­
stead of “falsifying” the semiotic enterprise, only circumvents fundamental issues 
surrounding the ontological status of a musical sign.
7 There are casual appropriations of the term sign that have engendered much of analy­
tic significance, e.g., Janet M. Levy, “Texture as a Sign in Classic and Early Romantic Music,” 
Journal o f the American Musicological Society 35 (3): 482-531 and Vera Micznik, “Gesture as 
Sign: A Semiotic Interpretation of Berg’s Op. 6, No. 1.,” In Theory Only 9, no. 4 (1986): 19-35. 
Nevertheless, a formalized semiotics of music will ultimately be judged on its ability to define 
its most fundamental entity.
8 V. Kofi Agawu, Playing with Signs: A semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991), 16.
9 Ibid., 23.
10 Ibid., 23.
11 Ibid., 45.
12 Ibid., 51.
13 Ibid., 51.
14 Ibid., 62.
15 Ibid., 96.
16 Ibid., 103.
17 Ibid., 109.
18 Ibid., 109.
19 Ibid., 110.
20 Ibid., 117.
The later work of Nattiez, for many years the widely recognized doyen of mu­
sical semiology,21 attempts to fold Peirce’s conception of the sign into a largely 
structuralist model of musical analysis. In his M usic and Discourse: Tow ard  
a Semiology o f Music, Nattiez asserts that the essential task of musical semiology 
“is to identify interpretants according to the three poles of the tripartition, and to 
establish their relationship to one another”.22 As such, he considers his entire book 
to be “both a defense and an illustration of the Peircian concept of the sign”.23 But 
in what appears to be an about-face, Nattiez retreats from the explanatory power 
and methodological implications of Peirce’s triadic conception of the sign by re­
porting that while “rummaging through the Collected Papers” he “was able to turn 
up no fewer than twelve different definitions of the sign and the interpretant”.24 
As a result, he feels that because “Peirce’s thought is so complex, and so often 
contradictory, reconstruction of the coherent Peircian doctrine seems at the pre­
sent nearly impossible”.25 Nattiez’s solution is to declare that because “neither the 
interpretation nor the application can correspond absolutely to any single, stable 
state of Peircian thought”,26 “one has the option of choosing from among [Peirce’s] 
definitions one that seems to correspond most closely to the reality of things”.27
21 For some music theorists during the eighties and early nineties (e.g., Nicholas Cook, A Gu­
ide to Musical Analysis [New York: George Braziller, 1987], and Jonathan Dunsby and Arnold 
Whittall, Music analysis: In Theory and Practice [New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1988]), Nattiez’s 
theories and their congeners were often described as the only approach to musical semiotics.
22 Jean Jacques Nattiez, Music and discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music, trans. C. Abbate 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1990), 29.
23 Ibid., 8.
24 Ibid., 6.
25 Ibid., 7.
26 Ibid., 7.
27 Ibid. 8 n. 8. Nattiez’s appropriation of Peirce has been challenged in Robert S. Hatten, 
‘Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music Kofi Agawu Music and Discourse: 
Toward a Semiology of Music Jean-Jacques Nattiez Carolyn Abbate,’ Music Theory Spectrum 
14, no. 1 (1992), doi:10.2307/746084 and in William P. Dougherty, ‘The Play of Interpretants: 
A Peircean Approach to Beethoven’s Lieder,’ in The Peirce Seminar Papers: An Annual of Semiotic 
Analysis, ed. Michael Shapiro (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 67-95. Regarding the textual exegesis that 
troubles Nattiez, it is relevant to note that Peirce developed his semeiotic over a span of nearly 
fifty years, during which time he repeatedly returned to fundamental issues in order to try to 
clarify his thinking on the subject. As is the case with any writer whose ideas evolve over time, 
a reconstruction of a single coherent doctrine poses many difficulties, but it should be undertaken 
without an ad hoc appeal to whatever “seems to correspond most closely” to one’s own view of 
the reality of things. Be that as it may, it is ultimately Nattiez’s emphasis on the analysis of the 
neutral level that cannot be accommodated in a Peircean semeiotic. Although Music and Discourse 
offers important clarifications regarding this controversial level of analysis and its relationship 
to his (now expanded) tripartition that go beyond the formulations in his Fondements d ’une 
sémiologie de la musique (Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Fondements d ’une sémiologie de la Musique 
[Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1975]), and although we are promised further explication in 
future volumes (a project that does not appear to be on Nattiez’s docket any longer), the goal of
The damaging, but predictable, outcome of these equivocations over funda­
mental definitions is that appeals to semiotic theory have become, for many music 
theorists, an impenetrable terminological fog, the explanatory power of which is 
neither particularly parsimonious nor especially relevant to musical analysis— 
this despite the productive interdisciplinary exchanges that have shaped, and 
continue to shape, the music-theoretic landscape. Indeed, the commonly leveled 
charge is that music semioticians encrust their attempts to detail the nature of 
musical signification with an obscure and largely uninformative metalanguage. 
If music theory is to include a semiotic perspective as a potent weapon in its 
analytic arsenal, then musical semioticians must establish well-defined points of 
contact between the two disciplines that go beyond ad hoc and impressionistic 
appropriations of semiotic concepts and terminology into music analysis. To 
direct the vitality of such points of contact into a discussion that illustrates the 
theoretical and methodological potential of a (Peircean) semeiotic approach to 
musical analysis, I will analyze a single musical topic: the fantasia, one of those 
catalogued by Leonard Ratner.28
The notion of topics, or subjects for musical discourse, has been incorporated 
into a semiotic theory of musical analysis by, among others, Agawu, who contends 
that “topics are musical signs. They consist of a signifier (a certain disposition of 
musical dimensions) and a signified (a conventional stylistic unit, often but not 
always referential in quality). Signifiers are identified as a relational unit within 
the dimensions of melody, harmony, meter, rhythm, and so on, while the signi­
fied is designated by conventional labels drawn mostly from eighteenth-century 
historiography (Sturm und Drang, fanfare, learned style, sensibility, and so on)”.29 
On this dyadic formulation, which owes its ontological allegiance to Saussure’s 
construal of the sign as the indissoluble union of a signifier and a signified, a topic 
qua musical sign embodies a signifier that is articulated by the complex interaction
analysis of the neutral level is still one of delimiting and classifying phenomena (i.e., taxonomy) 
systematically and objectively (i.e., empirically) without reference to esthesic or poietic points 
of view. For Nattiez, “neutral” means both that the poietic and esthesic dimensions of the object 
have been “neutralized,” and that one proceeds to the end of a given procedure regardless of 
the results obtained” (Mosley, Gesture, sign, and song, 13). In lieu of the detailed consideration 
that this position requires, suffice it to say that Peirce’s insistence on the tri-relative nature of 
semeiosis means that interpretation cannot be filtered out of the analysis, set aside, as it were, 
with the hope that it may become relevant at some later analytic stage. Peirce perhaps said it 
best when he observed that “it seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder it, that a sign 
should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning” (CP 5:448n).
28 Leonard G. Ratner, Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style (New York, London: 
Schirmer Books; Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1980).
29 Agawu, Playing with signs, 49. For more extended discussions of Agawu’s semiology, see 
Hatten, “Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music Kofi Agawu Music and 
Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Carolyn Abbate and William 
P. Dougherty, The Quest for Interpretants: Toward a Peircean Paradigmfor Musical Semiotics, 
Semiotica 99 (1-2): 163-84.
of various musical parameters and a signified whose nature “remains implicit in 
the historically appropriate label invoked”.30 Example 1 depicts the dichotomous 
structure of this relationship in the context of its Saussurean origins.
*
Example 1. Dyadic model of the sign (after Saussure), with mapping onto the standard
view of a musical topic
It is precisely here that Peirce’s semeiotic offers a ramified, innovative, and 
revolutionary conception that clears a path through the thorny issues surround­
ing the interpretive significance of the musical sign, providing a portal to the very 
essence of musical semeiosis. For Peirce, the sign is triadic (ex. 2), and he defined 
it as “something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or 
capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an 
equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call 
the “interprétant” of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its “object”. It 
stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which 
I have sometimes called the “ground” of the [sign]”.31 In Peirce’s triadic scheme, 
semeiosis (or sign action and sign interpretation) only arises when three items 
(a sign, its object, and its interprétant) coalesce in such a way that the sign stands 
for some object to an interprétant that translates the sign and thereby stands for 
the same object as potentially another sign. Thus, according to Peirce, semeiosis 
is “an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of “three” subjects, 
such as a sign, its object, and its interprétant, this tri-relative influence not being 
in any way resolvable into actions between pairs”.32
30 Agawu, Playing with Signs, 39.
31 CP 2:228; see also Peirce, Philosophical Writings o f Peirce, 99.
32 CP 5:484; see also ibid., 282. Eero Tarasti avers that “the whole dispute over whether the 
structure of the sign is binary or ternary is out-dated, since what is essential is not the inner orga­
nization of the sign but its functioning as part of the semiosphere, a continuum of signs” (Tarasti, 
A Theory of Musical Semiotics, xiv). In the context of this article, Tarasti’s argument rings hollow: 
It is precisely a view of the structure of the sign, and specifically, the structure of the musical sign, 
that determines how it participates in the web of sign relations. Like all well-formed hypotheses,
Sign
Example 2. Triadic model of the sign (after Peirce)
There are several cardinal advantages to Peirce’s triadic conception of the 
sign.33 First, a sign is a genuine triad or gestalt that cannot be broken down: no 
one of its three members can be defined or understood without reference to the 
other two. Consequently, while specific analyses require an examination of each 
component separately, all components must ultimately be analyzed in relation 
to the integrated whole.34 Second, the central emphasis in Peirce’s semeiotic is 
on interpretation. Throughout his voluminous writings, Peirce steadfastly and 
consistently maintains that a sign is a sign only if it is interpreted: to be a sign is 
ipso facto to determine an interprétant. Third, the interprétant is a translation 
into another (potential) sign that can take the form not only of thoughts (logical 
interprétants), but also of actions (energetic interprétants) and feelings (emotional 
interprétants). Thus, one’s mental representation of the word “man” as a logical 
interprétant of the sign “homme” does not differ in terms of semeiotic pertinence 
from the energetic interprétant embodied by one’s stopping at a stop sign or the 
emotional interprétant embodied by one’s relief at seeing one’s luggage after an 
airline decided it needed a few days away. Fourth, sign and interprétant are dis­
tinguished from one another in that the interprétant is determined by (or follows)
a theory of musical semiotics must address the critical questions surrounding its basic premises 
to have any practical relevance to the object under examination and to avoid charges of theore­
tical impoverishment. The sophistication of Peirce’s semeiotic, a singular result of its emphasis 
on the triadic nature of the sign, is the vehicle that leads to acute and astute semeiotic analysis.
33 In the following points and, indeed, in my understanding of Peirce’s semeiotic, I have 
greatly profited from my study with two scholars whose respective construals of Peirce are mo­
dels of clarity and perspicacity; see Shapiro, The Sense o f Grammar and Savan, An Introduction 
to C.S. Peirce’s Full System of Semeiotic. Hatten also explores some of the differences between 
dyadic and triadic conceptions of the sign (Robert S. Hatten, “A Peircean Perspective on the 
Growth of Markedness and Musical Meaning”, in Peirce and Value Theory: On Peircian Ethics 
and Aesthetics, ed. Herman Parret, Semiotic crossroads 6 (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins, 1994), 349-58).
34 The circularity with which the constituents of the sign are defined is not vicious. As Shapiro 
observes, “the mutual ontological dependency of the three constituents on each other is a reflection 
of the structure of semeiosis” (Shapiro, The Sense o f Grammar, 48). Incidentally, this axiomatic 
ontological dependency is absent from Nattiez’s focus on the neutral level (see note 8 above).
the sign. Consequently, triadic analysis reveals semeiosis to be a dynamic process 
that embraces growth, change, evolution, temporality, and teleology.35
Armed with an overview of Peirce’s triadic conception of the sign, it is time to 
analyze a specific musical example. Measures 97 to 108 of example 3, a passage 
from the development section of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata op. 2, no. 3, represent 
the topic fantasia. These measures are a particular configuration of musical ele­
ments that stand for some object to an interprétant; in other words, they are a sign. 
Considered in itself, this sign has specific features (what Peirce called the “ground”) 
by which the object it stands for is interpreted by the sign (i.e., interprétant) into 
which the original sign is translated. The ground is not the same as the sign- 
vehicle, because a sign-vehicle may have many features that are irrelevant to its 
functioning as a sign: for example, a road sign with a curved arrow will iconically 
signify its object regardless of the particular color, material, or shape of the sign, 
or regardless of whether it is tacked to a tree or supported by a stake. In example 
3, the ground of the topic-as-sign is: (1) the conjunct ascending chromatic bass 
line; (2) the unstable and wandering harmonic progression exemplified by the 
series of passing chords bound by common tones; (3) a thwarting of harmonic 
expectations (e.g., the fortissimo arrival on the B-flat major-minor seventh chord 
in m. 97 implies a continuation of the circle-of-fifths progression of previous 
measures, but it actually initiates the chromatic bass ascent to D); (4) the use of 
potentially tonally-orienting chords (e.g., major-minor seventh chords [mm. 97-8; 
103-4], diminished-seventh chords [mm. 99-100], second-inversion triads [mm. 
101-2, and 105-6]) without local resolutions of their implied tonal directionality; 
(5) the full keyboard texture created by the quasi-improvisatory sixteenth-note 
broken-chord patterns of the right hand and the closely-spaced chords of the left 
hand; and (6) the somewhat unpredictable patterning of the four-note arpeggiated 
figuration. This piece-specific occurrence of the fantasia, or “token”, is an idi­
osyncratic instancing of a set of more abstract characteristics, or “type”, whose 
relatively invariant nature supports a supple range of play in actual realizations. 
The abstract traits that define fantasia as a type include the following:36 (1) a freely
35 This evolutionary component further distinguishes Peirce’s semeiotic from Saussure’s 
semiology in that Saussure strove to filter diachrony out of his synchronic analyses. Peirce’s 
emphasis on semeiosis as synthesis (or thirdness, as he called it, after his triad of categories), 
which by definition embodies processes of inferential growth — abductive, as well as deductive 
and inductive — better accommodates the inherent relationship between synchrony and dia­
chrony, and thus, as Shapiro argues, “change is... conceived as an aspect of continuity” (ibid., 
19; also see Savan, An Introduction to C. S. Peirce’s Full System of Semeiotic, 9-14). In a series 
of articles, Hatten has demonstrated how this perspective can help a music theorist account for 
style growth and, ultimately, style change (e.g., Robert S. Hatten, Musical Meaning in Beetho­
ven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation, 1st ed., Musical meaning and interpretation 
[Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994]).
36 I have pointed out elsewhere (see William P. Dougherty, “The Quest for Interpretants: 
Toward a Peircean Paradigm for Musical Semiotics,” Semiotica 99 ,1 -2  [1994]) that one of the
improvised character, which is neutral with respect to mode, meter, or tempo; (2) 
wandering harmonies; (3) chromatic bass lines; (4) sequential patterns; (5) disjunct 
and often elaborate (or even eccentric) figurations; (6) modal coloration; (7) loose 
and discontinuous structural relationships; (8) an unconstrained juxtaposition 
of rhythmic or melodic figurations; (9) sudden and sometimes violent contrasts 
in textures, dynamics, harmonies, and registers; and (10) a general thwarting of 
expectations. These abstract traits are part of the dynamic object of the musical 
sign in this case, and, following Peirce’s understanding of the sign in relation to 
its object as one of “secondness” (a relation characterized by brute and obstinate 
existence and related by opposition and contrast to some other existents),37 there 
is a necessary dyadism in its description. The essential point to note is that this 
relationship is part of the larger triadic semeiotic, which must account for the in­
terprétants (‘thirds”) that subsume it.38 As Hatten observes, “[...] topics [...] involve
difficulties with topical analyses is a lack of clearly defined musical attributes that characterize any 
specific topic either at the level of the composition (which lam  here calling the topical token) or at 
the level of the style (which I refer to as the topical type). In his study, Agawu (Agawu, Playing with 
Signs) does in fact provide useful descriptions of some of the features that determine a topic, but 
the reader must generally extract them from the context. My listing of characteristics here, which 
borrows from both Agawu and Ratner (Ratner, Classic Music) while it goes beyond them, is offered 
as a prolegomenon to a more thorough catalogue of topical attributes. Jonathan Bellman (Jonathan 
Bellman, The style hongrois in the music of Western Europe [Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1993]) addresses the problems associated with loose characterizations of overarching topical 
categories in his examination of the style hongrois topic, and in the process he offers a detailed 
explication of the characteristics associated with the style hongrois. Raymond Monelle (Raymond 
Monelle, The Musical Topic: Hunt, Military and Pastoral, Musical meaning and interpretation 
[Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006]) provides a path-breaking discussion of the hunt, 
military, and pastoral topics that takes as its starting point many of the ideas discussed in this 
essay. Hatten (Hatten, Musical Meaning in Beethoven and Interpreting Musical Gestures, 2004) 
provides many insightful descriptions of the musical characteristics associated with certain topics.
37 Peirce coined the neologisms firstness, secondness, and thirdness to distinguish his 
categorial theory from those of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. The metaphysical breadth of Peirce’s 
categories makes it impossible here to offer anything more than a glimpse into their natures. 
For Peirce, firstness is quality, secondness is relation, and thirdness is mediation (see Peirce’s 
famous 1867 essay “On a New List of Categories” reprinted in W  2:49-59, EP 1:1-10, and Peirce, 
Peirce on Signs, 23-33).
38 In the interests of clarity, I skirt a number of crucial issues here surrounding Peirce’s 
hierarchic divisions in his theory of the categories (thirds embed seconds, which embed firsts), 
but a semeiotic analysis of topics at the level of style would necessarily treat them as signs, and 
therefore would be concerned with the similarities and differences in grounds, objects, and 
interprétants that are evident in fantasia as a type and, say, Sturm-und-Drang as a type. To 
reconstruct the broad oppositional characteristics that determine a stylistic type, theorists may 
avail themselves of the evidence provided by individual tokens and the information contained 
in contemporary writings. However, the free range of compositional play in tokens (in terms of 
both syntactic functions and semantic functions) may engender new stylistic types, and thus types 
(or thirds at the level of style, in Peirce’s hierarchic nesting of categories) embody a potential for 
growth in that any compositional token (a second at the level of the piece) may carve out a new
syntheses whose emergent interpretation cannot be merely after the fact, as a mere 
summing up of analytical detail. Nor, on the other hand, can critical interpretation 
ignore these processes by presupposing that listeners somehow “put it all together 
in their minds.” Rather, the modes of synthesis and emergence can and must be 
woven into the very fabric of musical explanation”.39
Example 3. Beethoven, Piano Sonata op. 2, no. 3, mm. 97-110
The issue of the object of the sign, or what the sign represents, is more treacher­
ous. Peirce defines the object of a sign as “that with which [the sign] presupposes 
an acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it”.40 
Savan explains that by the object of a sign, Peirce means “1) that which is prior to 
the sign, and is therefore known collaterally, and 2) that which is shared by a sign 
and its interprétants, that which is public and is essential to a community”.41 Peirce 
further segments his conception of the object by dividing it into im mediate objects 
and “dynamic objects’: “we must distinguish between the Immediate Object, — i.e. 
the Object as represented in the sign, — and [...] the [Dynamic] Object, which, from
type (or third, at the level of the piece) that is then assimilated as a type in the style (or third on 
the style level). Another way of putting it is that laws (types or thirds) are not exhausted by their 
specific cases (tokens or seconds). For a more detailed discussion of style growth and style change 
in terms of Peirce’s categories, see Hatten, Musical Meaning in Beethoven.
39 Robert S. Hatten, Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven, 
Schubert, Musical meaning and interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 3
40 CP 2:231: see also Peirce, Philosophical Writings o f Peirce, 100.
41 Savan, An Introduction to C.S. Peirce’s Full System of Semeiotic, 26.
the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave 
the interpreter to find out by collateral experience”.42 Short explains this distinc­
tion as follows: “The immediate object is the world, or some part of it, as the sign 
represents it to be, while the dynamic object is the world — or relevant portion 
of it — that will actually determine the success or failure of any given interprétant 
of the sign”.43 In effect, this differentiation is a continuum, which begins with the 
object as the sign represents it (the immediate object) and ends with the object 
as it would be known after full and exhaustive investigation (the dynamic object).
An example might help clarify the distinction. I feel pleasure when I recognize 
an old friend approaching me from afar. As the person draws closer, a more thor­
ough investigation reveals that the dynamic object (my actual friend) corresponds 
to the immediate object of the sign, or those characteristics of the sign (gait, height, 
hair color, and so on) that indexically indicated my friend. The sign has therefore 
offered an assurance to the interprétant (my pleasure) that the dynamic object and 
immediate object are in fact the object that the interprétant interprets. Alterna­
tively, should fuller investigation reveal that the person approaching me is not my 
old friend, then the dynamic object of the sign (now the stranger) impinges upon 
and reshapes the immediate object, and I am forced to recognize the fallibility of 
the interpretation in this instance.
In music, a play with the difference between immediate object and dynamic 
object might be heard in deceptive cadences, phrase elisions, enharmonic rein­
terpretations of German augmented-sixth chords, or Haydnesque uses of closing 
thematic materials as opening themes. But in general, so-called absolute music 
tends to blend the immediate and dynamic objects into a qualitative complex. Be 
that as it may, for the fantasia token in example 3, and for the fantasia as a stylistic 
type, the expressive attitude that constitutes the immediate object might be labeled 
“searching instability” and the dynamic object might be the larger relevant intertex- 
tual relations as well as the socio-cultural and historical attitudes that contextually 
constitute a portion of the real world known through prior experience with other 
signs and through further consideration of this sign.44
I advance my specification of the expressive attitude represented by the sign 
with trepidation, and I qualify it by claiming, to echo Agawu, that I am not as con­
42 CP 8:314.
43 Short, Semiosis and Internationality, 214. Other logicians, such as Frege, Russell, and 
Quine, have tried to parse, albeit in varying ways, this difference in terms of sense/reference, 
Sinn/Bedeutung, or connotation/denotation. While Peirce’s immediate/dynamic distinction 
is somewhat similar to these other pairs, it is generally construed by Peircean scholars to be 
much broader.
44 By assigning a linguistic label to the expressive attitude that might constitute the imme­
diate object, we have necessarily entered the realm of interprétants; in other words, “searching 
instability” is actually a sign of an expressive attitude, or, rather, another interprétant of the 
musical sign. To talk about objects (or, for that matter, to talk about signs), one must use inter­
prétants (which are, after all, other signs).
cerned with the “what” of musical signification as I am with the “how”. As a result, 
the term expressive attitude is meant to convey a responsive disposition that the 
musical sign represents, a disposition that could be (provisionally) adopted by 
a competent interpreter as a (potentially) valid description of the immediate object. 
It is not an assertion of the one or the only object. Nevertheless, any attempt to 
examine music critically as a semeiotic phenomenon must try to account for the 
object of the sign, however tentatively. Otherwise, terms such as “represents, signi­
fies, stands for, suggests,” and their congeners will become even more suspicious in 
musicological discourse than they already are. In light of these caveats, perhaps it 
is enough to assert that the immediate and dynamic object of any sign function as 
the prior and necessary conditions of signification and as a context that establishes 
part of the conditions from which interpretation can proceed.45 As will become ap­
parent, the interprétant is the arena of critical interpretation and appraisal.
The most valuable and enduring legacy of Peirce’s semeiotic is the concept 
of the interprétant. A red light is simply electromagnetic radiation at a particu­
lar wavelength; a fluctuation in air pressure indicated on a barometer is simply 
a change in the weight of the circumambient atmosphere. They become a sign, of 
danger in the first case and of rain in the second, only when they are interpreted, 
or taken, as a sign. Although the concept of the interprétant is unquestionably the 
most fundamental component of Peirce’s doctrine of signs, it also introduces an 
array of complications, in large part due to the fact that Peirce’s own accounts of 
it vary depending on the context in which he discusses it. Indeed, throughout his 
writings he continually refashions his conception in an on-going struggle to hone 
its modalities. Nevertheless, the concept is critical, and problems of textual exegesis 
should not deter us from exploiting its full explanatory potential.
Recall Peirce’s definition of the sign cited above: “A sign [...] is something 
which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses 
somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps 
a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interprétant of the 
first sign.” Peirce also says that “a sign [...] is an object [i.e., an entity or a thing] 
which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interprétant on the 
other hand in such a way as to bring the interprétant into a relation to the object 
corresponding to its own relation to the object”.46 At other points, Peirce defines 
the interprétant as “the proper significate outcome of a sign”,47 or as “the idea to 
which [the sign] gives rise”,48 or as the “cognition produced in the mind”.49 Indeed, 
in many respects, one of Peirce’s earliest definitions of the interprétant is his most 
accessible: the interprétant is “a mediating representation which represents the
45 Shapiro, The Sense o f Grammar, 38.
46 PW, 32.
47 CP 5:473; and Peirce, Philosophical Writings o f Peirce, 275.
48 CP 1:339.
49 CP 1:372; and Peirce, Peirce on Signs, 183.
relate [i.e., sign] to be a representation of the same correlate [i.e., object] which 
this mediating representation itself represents”.50
On the basis of his triad of categories, Peirce divides the interprétant into two 
intersecting trichotomies. The first trichotomy consists of “immediate interpré­
tants, dynamic interprétants,” and “final interprétants.” Briefly, the immediate 
interprétant is the explicit content of the sign that enables “a person to say whether 
or not the Sign was applicable to anything concerning which that person had suf­
ficient acquaintance,” or “the total unanalyzed effect that the sign is calculated to 
produce [...] [prior to] any critical reflection”.51 The dynamic interprétant is the 
actual semeiotic effect of a sign. The final interprétant is the full semeiotic effect that 
the sign would produce were it given a sufficiently long run and were it to satisfy 
fully the law, habit, or rule that governs the succession of dynamic interprétants.52 
In this scheme, there is one immediate interprétant, many dynamic interprétants, 
and one final interprétant. The immediate and final interprétants are ultimately 
correlates, except that the indefinitely postponed final interprétant includes the 
actualized dynamic interprétants. We are in the realm of the dynamic, or in médias 
res, which is to say that we are abductively or hypothetically testing the possibility 
of the immediate interprétant and the interpretive rule of the final interprétant.
Nattiez has appropriated Peirce’s notion of so-called unlimited semiosis — 
wherein an interprétant creates “an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed 
sign” that spins a web of sign, object, and interprétant relationships — to support 
his claim for an infinite chain of meanings that arise from any musical sign.53 But, 
according to Peirce, dynamic interprétants do not spin off unfettered. Instead, 
they are governed by the law-like regularity embodied in the final interprétant, 
the goal toward which they tend and that they reach given ideal circumstances and 
an indefinitely long run. Thus, the number of dynamic interprétants is finite, and 
the notion of the final interprétant hints at the means by which subjective inter­
pretations can be grounded in a broader intersubjective framework. As such, the 
concept can help us account for the relatively consistent interpretations of musical 
signs — interpretations that tend to be self-corrective.
Peirce’s second trichotomy of interprétants consists of “emotional interpré­
tants” (feelings), “energetic interprétants” (actions), and “logical interprétants”
50 CP 1:553; W 2:53 [see also W 1:446,1:473-479, and, especially, 1:523]; and ibid., 28. 
Incidentally, Savan suggests that Peirce might have profitably retained the term “correlate” in 
place of what he eventually called the object (Savan, An Introduction to C.S. Peirce’s Full Sy­
stem o f Semeiotic., 28). This terminological shading probably underlies the subtitle of Robert S. 
Hatten, “A Peircean Perspective on the Growth of Markedness and Musical Meaning,” in Peirce 
and Value Theory: On Peircian Ethics and Aesthetics, ed. Herman Parret, Semiotic crossroads
6 (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Beniamins, 1994), 349-58.
51 PW110.
52 PW 110; and CP 8:184.
53 Nattiez, Music and Discourse, 6-8.
(cognition). I will illustrate the details of this division by returning to example 3. 
As detailed above, mm. 97 to 108 are a sign that stands for an object, or expressive 
attitude, that is called “expectant instability.” One interpretant of the sign is the 
topical label/an tasia, a term that is a translation of the musical sign into another 
semeiotic system, a procedure Jakobson calls “intersemiotic translation”.54 This 
translation, in one form or another, is characteristic of all musical analyses. The 
expressive significance of the original sign is an actual semeiotic effect that stands 
in the same relation to the object as the original sign itself, and it is therefore 
a dynamic interpretant that can be analyzed along the continuum of emotional, 
energetic, and logical interpretants. In this case, the emotional interpretant, or 
what Peirce calls a “feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we com­
prehend the proper effect of the sign”,55 might be characterized as a sense of in­
security or unsteadiness. The energetic interpretant, or what Peirce envisions as 
an act in which some energy is expended, be it muscular exertion or the mental 
energy associated with the manipulation and exploration of the inner world of 
ideas, might be the recognized feeling of mercurial expectancy. (I use “recognized 
feeling” rather than “actualized feeling” to avoid an overdetermined theory of 
meaning based on simplistic assignments of emotion to musical motion.) Finally, 
the logical interpretant, or general habit of understanding actually produced by 
a sign, might be the realization that the expressive significance of the sign has 
been critically understood and provisionally or abductively valued as a culturally 
recognized cognitive category — an interpretant that would be tested through 
further consideration of the sign itself. The semeiotic structure of this musical sign 
is diagramed in example 4. 
measures 97-108 
(chromaticism, wandering 
harmonic progressions, etc.)
Example 4. Concretization of the musical sign in Beethoven, Piano Sonata op. 2, no. 3,
mm. 97-108
54 Roman Jakobson, Language in Literature, ed. Kiystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1987), 429.
‘fantasia’
‘searching instability’
‘mercurial
expectancy’
The exclusive focus on one aspect of the musical sign in example 3 is insufficient 
on at least two counts. First, it ignores the fluidity of the musical surface by isolating 
twelve measures, ignoring any immediate contextual relationships that obtain. It also 
does not account for the expressive significance that has accrued (e.g., the fantasia ele­
ments of the transition theme, mm. 27-39) and that will accrue in the movement (e.g., 
the fantasia that opens the coda, mm. 218-31, or the fantasia elements [in particular, 
the chromatic descent] embedded in the counterpoint of the so-called false transition 
in the recapitulation, mm. 147-55). Nor does it account for the way in which the wan­
dering harmonic progression typically associated with the fantasia compositionally 
abets the relative large-scale harmonic stability assumed by the false recapitulation in 
m. 109. Second, the analysis treats the musical sign as minimal and not as complex. 
Therefore, it ignores the concerto-like brilliance embedded in this particular fanta­
sia token, a topic that is extensively exploited and developed throughout the sonata 
(obvious examples are the cadenza in the first movement [m. 231] and the virtuosic 
displays in the final movement). To be sure, most musical signs are replete with an 
amalgamation of topical references that are conjoined through various procedures 
and thereby contribute to the semeiotic richness of the musical surface. Indeed, one 
of Agawu’s most consequential contributions to a topical theory of musical analysis 
is the recognition that topics are not only explicitly signified, but also latently im­
plied, embedded, emergent, transformed, foregrounded and backgrounded, and/or 
hierarchically organized.56 Although he does not detail the interpretive consequences 
of these possibilities, this supple richness in the types of significatory play can be ac­
commodated and explained by the semeiotic approach outlined here.
Returning briefly to the transition theme of the sonata (ex. 5), the primary topic 
of mm. 27-39 is a singing style whose defining characteristics are a homophonie 
texture emphasizing a lyric melody with a limited compass and mainly conjunct 
movement. As an overarching, stylistically available type, the singing style as a sign 
at the level of style might be said to have an expository lyricism as its object and 
a sense of untroubled serenity as one of its dynamic emotional interprétants, thus 
making it appropriate at and adaptable to relatively stable formal junctures, and 
these attributes are largely inherited by the token of op. 2, no. 3.57 But the token in 
these measures is also infused with (and perhaps confronted by) a latent fantasia, 
the ground of which is the modulatory and sequential character of the passage and 
the chromatic descent in both the melody and the bass. Clearly, the phrase exten­
sions, syncopations, mode, and key, while largely neutral with respect to the topics
56 These important varieties of topical interplay are from Agawu (Agawu, Playing with 
Signs, 38-9 , 42, 50, 86-7,129).
57 Incidentally, Beethoven refashioned this theme from material used in his early (1785) 
Piano Quartet in C major, WoO 36, no. 3 (mm. 37-47). The earlier work has a slightly different 
accompaniment pattern and some differences in ornamentation, and it lacks a repetition of the 
theme in D minor or a thematic expression of G major in the second theme group. In addition, 
unlike op. 2, no. 3, the Piano Quartet does not exploit the fantasia characteristics of the material, 
although there is a nod in the direction of the theme in the development section (mm. 84-85).
currently under consideration, also contribute to the play, and a more complete 
semeiotic analysis of the passage would necessarily include them as important 
dimensions.581 have tried to capture the semeiotic richness of these measures in 
terms of its blending of sign functions and, in particular, the composite interprétant 
that is perforce created in example 6.59
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Example 5. Beethoven, Piano Sonata op. 2, no. 3, mm. 27-40
58 I emphasize again that in this article I am concentrating exclusively on a spcific topic as 
a sign to demonstrate the efficacy and applicability of Peirce’s theories. But compositional pro­
cedures and processes (e.g., tonicization, mixture, modulation, key relationships, voice-leading, 
texture, chord spacing, form, and so on) are obviously signs, too. Thus, while textbook definitions 
of mixture typically emphasize that a borrowed chord usually retains the harmonic function of 
its diatonic counterpart, there is nevertheless a change in expressive meaning that goes beyond 
a mere change in diatonic color. The problems surrounding the types and modalities of these ex­
pressive alterations are difficult ones, but they are amenable to insights from semeiotic approaches 
to musical analysis (see Hatten, Musical Meaning in Beethoven and Hatten, Interpreting Musical 
Gestures, Topics, and Tropes., William P. Dougherty, “Mixture, Song, Semeiotic,” in Music and 
Signs: Semiotic and Cognitive Studies in Music, ed. Ioannis Zannos (Bratislava: ASCO Art and 
Science, 1999), 368-78. Naomi Cumming, The Sonic Self: Musical Subjectivity and Significa­
tion, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), and David Lidov, Is language a music? 
Writings on Musical Form and Signification, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005)).
59 A similar play with the blend of the lyric and fantasia topics (including a hint of the 
Sturm-und-Drang topic) is found in the second theme of the op. 2, no. 2 piano sonata, mm. 58- 
83. In that sonata, the contextual characteristics (i.e., the display episode [mm. 84-91] and the 
scherzando-like return to transition material [mm. 92-103] that immediately follows) suggest, 
as Dahlhaus has pointed out (Carl Dahlhaus, Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to his Music, 
with the assistance of trans. Mary Whittall (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 103-4), that the in­
terchange and redistribution of attributes (or sign, in semeiotic terms) between formal sections 
creates an ambiguity (which, when perceived, is an interpretant) that is a formal idea in itself 
(i.e., it collapses immediate and dynamic objects).
chromaticism 
sequential and modulatory
“searching
instability”
hon
‘fantasia’ 
‘mercurial expectancy’
‘singing style’ 
‘untroubled serenity’
embedded in
‘expository
lyricism”
Example 6. Concretization of a compound musical sign in Beethoven, Piano Sonata op. 2,
no. 3, mm. 27-39
The ambivalence with which much of the music-theoretic community has 
greeted appeals to semiotics can largely be blamed on the shaky supports that 
have been used to construct various music-semiotic theories. An unfortunate 
consequence of these unstable underpinnings is that the potential value offered 
by applications of semiotic theory to musical analysis has been undermined by 
charges of terminological impressionism, at best, or interdisciplinary legerdemain, 
at worst. But by casting the expressive significance of a musical sign as one of its 
most secure cornerstones, a triadic conception of the sign, securely grounded 
in Peirce’s general theory of signs, provides a sufficiently solid foundation from 
which musical semeioticians can erect a sturdy and substantial semeiotic edifice 
in which the realities of musical experience are comfortably housed. The focus on 
one specific topic as one type of musical sign has been intended not only to dem­
onstrate how this perspective challenges the hegemony of dyadic models but also 
to illustrate how the complexity of the issues at stake may be better addressed by 
a more fertile and cogent model. Composers use signs, but musical signification 
results from the play of interpretants. Redirecting analytic energies to an explicit 
engagement with this play will aid the quest to solve the riddle of music’s special 
modes of signification. In the process, it will help establish a truly cohesive theory 
of musical semeiotic.
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